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The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder
and Civic Democracy
Usha Rodrigues*

1. Introduction
"Democracy" is a powerful word in America. Perhaps that is why many
commentators cannot resist comparing the workings of democracy within the
corporation with those of democracy in the more familiar political realm.
Colleen Dunlavy makes such comparisons in Social Conceptions of the
Corporation: Insights from the History of Shareholder Voting Rights,!
shedding light on what a corporation's being more or less "democratic" might
mean. She uses history to point out that it is not natural or obvious that votes
should be allocated on the basis of share ownership.2 Indeed, in early corporate
America, each shareholder (rather than each share) received a vote. 3 This
allocation, she implies, is more truly democratic than allocating one-vote-pershare. 4
This Comment briefly describes Dunlavy's treatment of democracy in the
political and corporate worlds, and goes on to discuss how similar kinds of
democracies exist in both spheres. It then focuses on one little-explored
element of the political-world/corporate-world comparison by developing the
striking parallel between the operations ofthe Electoral College in the national
political setting and of boards of directors in the corporate world. The
Comment then steps back from this subject and argues that comparisons

* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. Thanks to participants of
the Understanding Corporate Law Through History Conference, Dan Bodansky, Dan Coenen,
Paul Heald, Toby Heytens, Elizabeth Nowicki, Chuck O'Kelley, and David Skeel. Mistakes
remain my own.
I. Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights fi'0111 the
HistolY ofShareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (2006).
2. See id. at 1356 (describing how one-vote-per-share is a relatively new phenomenon).
3. See id. at 1361 (noting that shareholders had one-vote-per-share for much of the
nineteenth century).
4. See id. at 1361-62 (indicating that the democratic end of the spectrum involves onevote-per-shareholder).
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between the corporate and CIVIC polities, while intellectually tempting,
ultimately falter because participation in a corporation fundamentally differs
from participation in a nation. Shareholders are not citizens; their investments
are voluntary and relatively liquid, and their proxy ballots lack the meaning and
power of citizens' votes. The exploration of the Electoral College/board of
directors analogy ultimately dead-ends because the board of directors, unlike
the modern Electoral College, plays a real and useful role in governance. All of
this confirms that Dunlavy's reflections are helpful and provocative. Their
primary value, however, lies more in illuminating the role of the shareholder
within the corporation than in raising a sustainable critique of corporate law's
failure to protect "shareholder democracy" itself.
II. Comparing Corporate and Political Democracy
Shareholder democracy has many advocates today, most ofwhom take for
granted the idea that this form of "democracy" means that each share of stock
equals one vote. Dunlavy reminds us that there is nothing natural about such a
division of voting power within a corporation and that, in fact, voting rules of
the nineteenth century deviated from this now-familiar pattern. 5 Dunlavy
characterizes the current one-share-one-vote model of shareholder democracy
as "plutocratic" because it allows the wealthier (or, atleast, larger) shareholders
to have more of a voice in governing the corporation. 6 She contrasts this
approach with the older, more truly "democratic" version of shareholder
democracy, under which each shareholder was given equal voting power
regardless of his or her level of share ownership--or at least there was a cap on
7
the voting power that came with the ownership of large numbers of shares.
5. See id. at 1361-62 (noting that in the early nineteenth century, the majority of
corporations did not have one-vote-per-share).
6. Dunlavy, supra note 1, at 1355.
7. See id. at 1357 (expressing how "prudent-mean" rules would put a ceiling on the
maximum number of votes per shareholder); see also Daniel 1. H. GreenWOOd, Markets and
Democracy: The Illegitimacy ofCorporate Law, 74 UMKC L. REv. 41, 84 (2005) (criticizing
corporate democracy). Greenwood claims:
Corporate "democracy," then, fails the most basic test of democracy. It does not
provide for equal citizenship, since it is based on an equality of dollar investments,
not of citizen members. Moreover, such corporate "democracy" does not provide
citizenship for the right people. While shareholders have limited (and unequal) say
in running the corporation, many other constituents and affected parties, some of
them (unlike most shareholders) even human, lack even a limited right to vote.
Id.; see also David L. Ratner, The Government ofBusiness Corporations: Critical Reflections
on the Rule of"One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 19 (1970) ("[One share, one
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In examining the meaning of "democracy," Dunlavy draws a parallel
between civic and corporate polities. Each involves a "body politic" (nation or
corporation), and each must distribute power among its constituents. s She is
not interested in the vertical relationships so familiar to corporate law
scholars-those between manager and employee, or manager and shareholder. 9
Instead, she urges us to consider the horizontal shareholder-shareholder
relationship.lO
By virtue of the one-vote-per-share principle, larger
shareholders inevitably have a greater say in corporate governance than do
smaller shareholders. One might say that although all shareholders are
theoretically equal, some are more equal than others-in striking contrast to the
operation of our modern political system, which is built on the principle of "one
person, one vote. ,,11

A. As Politics Democratized, Corporations Became Plutocracies

As Dunlavy notes, the one-person-one-vote rule has not always dominated
American political or corporate life. 12 She observes, for example, that in the
nineteenth century the government restricted the franchise based on
considerations like property ownership, race, and gender. 13 Although the
twentieth-century road toward universal suffrage has been rocky, these

vote] is inherently no more logical than making voting rights in school district elections
proportional to the school taxes paid by the voters or the numbers of their children enrolled in
the school system.").
8. Dunlavy, supra note 1, at 1350.
9. See id. at 1366-67 (commenting on the importance of the horizontal shareholder
relationship).
10.
11.

Id.

Of course, one can argue that some political voters are more equal than others-due to
Senate apportionment rules, voters in less populous states have a disproportionately powerful
vote in Senate elections and therefore in the presidential election via the Electoral College.
However, the focus of Dunlavy's criticism is on the plutocratic division of voting power in
today's corporations. Because in the political context such increased voting power is not a
function of increased wealth, but rather state residency, and therefore is not really plutocratic, I
will treat citizens' votes as equal for the purposes of this Comment. I refer to voting power,
narrowly defined-I am not asserting that political power does not increase with wealth. Public
choice theory is also relevant here. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK,
THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (Liberty Fund 1999); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW
AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991).
12. Dunlavy, supra note 1, at 1361 (noting that shareholders had one-vote-per-share for
much of the nineteenth century).
13. See id. at 1360 (noting the restrictions that existed on voting in the nineteenth
century).
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restrictions on the electorate have gradually disappeared. 14 In contrast, Dunlavy
suggests an opposite trend in corporate governance over the course of the
nineteenth century, one tending toward greater plutocracy and less democracy,
as larger shareholders gained a greater voice in governing the corporation. IS
She suggests that the resulting system is essentially undemocratic in nature. So
it may be-although, as I will discuss later, there are ways in which corporate
democracy is arguably more democratic than civic democracy.16

B. Taking the Analogy Further: Three Different Styles ofDemocracy
By comparing civic and corporate democracy, Dunlavy provides an
intriguing method by which to analyze and ultimately critique current corporate
voting structures. Fundamentally, Dunlavy asks, if we are to have corporate
democracy, why settle for anything less than the full democracy that we enjoy
in the political sphere? Indeed, with this question in mind, it becomes tempting
to identify and critique other "undemocratic" features of the corporation. In
particular, consider the peculiar form of "once removed" representative
democracy we utilize in the corporate polity, but have long abandoned in the
civic polity.
Both corporate and political democracies employ three different
democratic mechanisms: direct democracy, representative democracy,17 and
what I will call representative democracy "once removed." Direct democracy
means letting voters decide issues directly. State elections often present
14. Id.
15. See id. at 1360-61 (describing how voting rights increasingly became associated with
share ownership).
16. See infra Part IV (discussing corporate democracy's benefits).
17. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A SelfEnforcing Model ofCorporate Law,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1943-44 (1996) (contrasting direct democracy to representative
democracy). The authors explain:
There are two broad strategies available in choosing a review process for corporate
actions: representative democracy, under which shareholders elect representatives
(a board of directors) to act on the shareholders' behalf; and direct democracy,
under which shareholders directly approve particular actions. Representative
democracy alone is often unsatisfactory because boards can too easily become lazy
or be captured by management. Thus, the company laws of all developed countries
provide direct shareholder review of selected corporate actions such as mergers.
On the other hand, direct democracy is far too slow and costly for most corporate
decisionmaking. Moreover, because small shareholders must act on limited
information and face severe collective action problems, direct democracy can
quickly deteriorate into total manager control in widely-held companies.
Id.
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"directly democratic" referenda on issues ranging from bond issuances to
measures to cut social services to illegal immigrants. Similarly, in the corporate
world there are instances of "direct democracy," when the shareholders vote
I8
directly on a particular issue. The most notable example involves corporate
mergers. The Model Business Corporation Act and the Delaware General
Corporation Law, like the laws of most states, require direct shareholder votes
to approve mergers or the sale of all or substantially all corporate assets. I9
Direct democracy, however, is the exception rather than the rule in both
the corporate and political worlds. Relatively few issues in the political sphere
are put to referendum, and at very few times in a corporation's life do its
shareholders vote on major changes such as takeovers or liquidation. The main
work of the shareholder is to select corporate directors in regularly held
elections. Likewise, in the political arena voters select key representatives,
including Senators, House members, and the President of the United States,
who govern. The election of representatives involves indirect or representative
democracy because elected officials-and not the voters themselves-make the
critical day-to-day decisions for the polity.
Beyond direct and representative democracy, political electionsspecifically presidential elections-and corporate elections share a third style of
self-governance.
Both involve what one might call "once removed"
representative democracy. In order to select the President ofthe United States,
citizens vote for electors who make up the Electoral College. These electors in
turn vote for the President and Vice President. Similarly, within the corporate
world, shareholders vote for directors. These directors then choose managersthe chief executive officer, the chief financial officer, and other officers who
actually manage the corporation. In both cases, it is the elected individuals who
select the ultimate manager.
To many, the use of once removed representative democracy to select the
President and Vice President seems odd, unnatural, and unwise. 2o There seems
to be no reason to resort to an intermediary institution rather than direct election
18. Id.
19. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.04 (2005) (detailing merger provisions); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (c) (2005) (same); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 12.02 (noting sale of assets
provisions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (same). Shareholder approval is also required for
dissolution and amendments to the articles of incorporation. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 14.02 (explaining dissolution); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275 (same); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 10.03 (detailing the process for amendments); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (same).
20. A report of the American Bar Association calls the Electoral College "archaic,
undemocratic, complex, ambiguous, indirect, and dangerous." COMMISSION ON ELECTORAL
COLLEGE REFORM, ELECTING THE PRESIDENT: A REpORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTORAL
COLLEGE REFORM 3 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1967).
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to select the most important and powerful members of the federal government.
To the extent that critiques of"once removed" representative democracy at the
federal level have merit, they raise foundational questions with respect to
corporate law: Why not vote directly for management? Indeed, why have
boards of directors at all? Perhaps looking into the history of both institutions
can help answer these questions and also shed light on the possibility of
comparing the two.

C. Tracing the History ofthe Electoral College and Board ofDirectors
The Electoral College was originally designed as a way of insulating the
elite from the vote of the masses (more accurately, from the property-owning,
white, male masses). "What is most striking about the limited debate was the
dominance of one position-a distrust of the 'people' to elect the President. As
famously put by Virginia's George Mason, election by the people would be as
'unnatural' as 'to refer a trial of colours to a blind man. ,,,21 George Mason
posited that "the common man lacked the 'capacity' to assess a presidential
candidate. ,,22 Hamilton praised the Electoral College because it gave the final
choice to a small group who would be "most likely to possess the information
and discernment requisite" to select the President. 23 Elbridge Gerry argued that
"it was a 'radically vicious' idea to elect the President through the 'ignorance of
the people. ",24 Others "distrusted political parties" or "desire[d] ... independentminded electors. ,,25 In fact, "[t]he original conception ofthe electoral college was
a body of men who, through their personal knowledge and judgment, would
independently choose the President from among qualified Americans. ,,26
In practice, the Electoral College never actually functioned as a group of
27
autonomous individuals who voted without regard to the popular will.

21. Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and Its Meager Federalism, 88 MARQ. L.
REv. 195, 199 (2004) (quoting THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH
FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, REpORTED BY JAMES MADISON (Ouillard
Hunt

&

22.

James Brown Scott eds.,

Id.

at

1920)).

200.

23. DAN COENEN, AMERICA RECONCEIVED: HAMILTON, MADISON, AND THE STORY OF
THEIR FEDERALIST PAPERS 199 (Twelve Tables Press, forthcoming) (citing THE FEDERALIST No.
68 (Alexander Hamilton)).

24.
25.
26

Id.
Id.at214.
Id. at 209.

27. MARTIN DIAMOND, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE AMERICAN IDEA OF DEMOCRACY
3 (1977).
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Despite the founders' dread offactionalism, "[p]arty politics quickly obliterated
the original conception of the electoral college as a body of men who, through
their personal knowledge and judgment, would independently choose the
President among qualified Americans. ,,28 And so, despite this early distrust of
the general electorate, "[b]y 1824, most states decided to choose their electors
through popular vote-a practice that is universal today. ,,29 In today's
elections, voters generally do not even see the names of the electors on their
ballots. Instead, they simply vote for the party candidates. 3o For these reasons,
"[s]oon after 1787 the electoral college vote became, and remains today, merely
a formality. ,,31 Although in some early elections, and in 2000, the winner ofthe
Electoral College has not been the winner of the popular vote,32 the electors are
now basically "nullities," hardly the "wise, autonomous, detached" decision
makers that the framers envisioned. 33
In the corporate polity, by way of contrast, there has been no similar
movement toward a more "direct" form of representative democracy. As we
know, shareholders do not vote for the individuals who actually run the
company. Instead, shareholders vote for mere representatives, the board of
directors, who in turn choose the actual managers of the corporation. 34
It is not clear, however, that once-removed representative democracy was
always the dominant corporate model. There are indications that, early in the
development of the corporate form, directorship positions were not in fact
functionally different from management positions. 35 There is a striking, and
often frustrating interchangeability ofthe terms "director" and "officer" in early
corporate discourse. Historians also have conflated the terms "management"

28. Boudreaux, supra note 21, at 209.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 210.
32. See Jamin B. Raskin, What's Wrong With Bush v. Gore and Why We Need to Amend
the Constitution to Ensure It Never Happens Again, 61 MD. L. REV. 652, 696 (2002) (noting
that in the 2000 presidential election, Gore won the popular vote, but the Electoral College
awarded the presidency to Bush).
33. DIAMOND, supra note 27, at 2-3.
34. It may be said that a vote for the directors is a vote for management. Still, the board
of directors differs from the Electoral College in that it is not merely convened every four years
for the purpose of electing a leader. Votes for the board may be retrospective endorsements of
the current management, but they are in no sense prospective votes that actually, if indirectly,
select the officers.
35. For helpful histories ofthe evolution of the board of directors, see Mitchell, infra note
84 and Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of
Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 89 (2004).
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and "board of directors.,,36 Thus, it is not entirely clear whether, as early
shareholders voted for a board of directors, they were (l) choosing the
membership of a supervisory entity that oversaw the managers of the
corporation or (2) selecting the actual managers of the corporation who would
run the day-to-day operations.
In fact, there are clues that the latter might be the case. For example, in
the 1834 New Jersey case Taylor v. Griswold,37 the charter at issue named the
first president and officers, and then stated "[w]hich president, &c. shall
continue in office during the term of one year from the time of passing this act,
or until other person shall be appointed in their stead, by a majority of the
stockholders, at a meeting of the said stockholders to be convened for that
purpose. ,,38 The charter also seems to conflate the two terms: "[It] shall and
may be lawful for the said corporation, or a majority thereof, to appoint
annually, or at any other time they shall deem proper, a president, secretary,
&c., or any other officer or officers they shall judge necessary. ,,39 This
language at least suggests that the shareholders were voting directly for both the
officers and directors.
If shareholders originally either voted directly for the officers of the
corporation or voted for individuals who were "directors" in name but were
functionally officers, then what caused the creation of the modern board of
directors designed to carry out an oversight, rather than a management,
function? According to Alfred Chandler, individual or family investors
originally participated in management or at least retained power over major
corporate decisions. 40 Over time, however, these family investors gave way to
institutional investors that placed "part-time representatives on the firm's
board.,,41 And precisely because these "outside" board members could and did
devote only part of their time to a particular corporate entity, they eventually
ceded responsibility for day-to-day business management to a separate cadre of
full-time corporate managers. 42
36. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780- J97094-95 (1970) (interchanging the terms "management"
and "board of directors").
37. Taylor v. Griswold, 14 NJ.L. 222 (1834).
38. Id. at 224 (first emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 9 (1977) (noting that when partnerships began to incorporate, the stock
stayed in the hands of individuals or families).
41. Id.
42. Id. Although according to Stephen M. Bainbridge, citing Walter Wemer, this account
may be incorrect. Bainbridge argues that ownership and control separated at a much earlier
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This story of the rise of the managerial class explains how the board
gradually relinquished power to the managers, but not how the board-rather
than management-came to be the focal point of shareholder voting.
Borrowing from the history of the Electoral College, we could posit that the
managers and the original large investors intended to limit investors to the role
of board service and to reduce shareholders to voting only for a largely
functionary board, the equivalent of the modern Electoral College. Maybe the
shareholders were relegated to voting for the board of directors so that the
officers, the true decision makers, could be insulated from the shareholder
electorate, safe from the "ignorance of the people," as Elbridge Gerry might
43
have said.

III. Problems with Comparing Political and Corporate Democracy

Why did shareholders come to vote for board members (representative
democracy once removed), rather than for managers (pure representative
democracy)? The answer to this question is not clear, but before going farther
down this path of conjecture, it may be helpful to examine Dunlavy's
assumption that useful comparisons can be drawn at all between the corporate
44
and the civic polity. Comparisons of this kind are common and tempting.
But corporations and political states are marked by differences so fundamental
that it is dangerous to extrapolate lessons from one realm to the other. Four key
contrasts between the corporation and the state demonstrate why: (1) investing
in a corporation is a completely voluntary endeavor; (2) representative
democracy plays only a limited role in a corporation; (3) the shareholder vote,

time, so that "there never was a time in which unity of control and ownership was a central
feature of U.S. corporation[s]." Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder
Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REv. 601, 620-21 (2006) (citing Walter Werner, Corporation Law
in Search ofIts Future, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1611, 1637 (1981).
43. K.AD. Camara writes of the "dark stories" that commentators tell about corporate
law:
In corporate translation, shareholder voting is something managers point to when
they want to say that shareholders are in control. Managers, they meekly remind
us, can be ousted annually by the shareholders they serve. In dark stories, voting is
a means of power preservation for a group other than the voters or the publicly
acknowledged beneficiaries of voting.
K.AD. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors, 30 J. CORP. L. 219, 246-47 (2005). Camara
concludes without explanation that "[d]ark stories seem more plausible in the political than in
the corporate context." Id. at 247.
44. See id. at 245 (noting that shareholder democracy is often compared to political
democracy).
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with the important exception of takeovers, is generally an empty exercise; and
(4) shareholders have an important power that political voters lack: the power
of easy exit through the sale of their shares-that is, the power to leave their
polity.

A. Investing Is Voluntary,' Living in a Civic Polity Is Not
First, investors choose to invest in the corporate form. They can also
invest in pat1nerships, limited liability companies, or sole proprietorships-or
not invest at all. Even more importantly, each of these alternative business
forms gives the investor the potential for a much greater voice in the
management of the business. Some of these entities even involve Dunlavy's
favored system of "one person, one vote" democracy. Under common law, for
example, partners have an equal vote in the management ofthe partnership, and
the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act and the Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act preserve this one-vote-per-member/partner default
rule. 45 Against this legal backdrop, if an investor seeks to have an equal say in
the governance of the entity in which she invests, she is free to pursue it by
putting her money into profit-seeking entities that take the partnership form.
However, to impose a one-person-one-vote regime on the corporate fonn seems
to limit investors' options unduly. One-person-one-vote may resonate with the
American sensibility, but so does the idea of freedom of choice.
B. Voting Is Fundamental to the Civic Polity, but Not to
the Corporate Polity
There is a second basic difference between corporate and political selfgovernance: In most instances, investors are not looking for a democratic
experience. As Greenwood has noted:
[T]he basic self-understanding of corporate law is not political at all.
Corporate law does not imagine directors to play the role of elected
representatives ofthe "people" or even ofthe dollar investments offictional
shareholders for the simple reason that corporate law does not imagine
directors to be making the value choices that are the appropriate realm of
elective politics. 46

45
See REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1997) § 401(f); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (1996)
§ 404(a) (discussing member-managed LLCs, which have a more partnership-like structure).
46. Greenwood, supra note 7, at 84.
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In other words, the shareholder does not vote "to make value choices, to
reaffirm common membership in a joint enterprise, or to give meaning to
collective commitments,,,47 as voters do in the political realm. Instead, she
votes "to keep directors within their role requirements, [and] to ensure thatthey
are not stealing from the corporation or distorting it to some other purpose. ,,48
In short, shareholder "democracy" exists only to "police the professionals. ,,49 It
makes little sense to say that the political model for voting should carryover to
the corporate context when the reasons for voting in each ofthe two settings are
entirely different.

C. Shareholder Democracy as Empty Exercise
There is a third way in which corporate and civic democracy differ.
Shareholder democracy is extremely undemocratic in actual practice because,
50
unlike political democracy, it offers voters no real choice at all. Because of
corporate election structure, shareholders have no choice between nominees.
The incumbent board (or, post-Sarbanes-Oxley, a nominating committee
appointed by the board) puts forward a slate of candidates. 5 ! There is almost
always only one candidate for each vacant director seat. Unlike the election for
the presidency, there is no choice between Candidates A and B; a shareholder's
only choice is CandidateA. Running an opposing ballot is possible but costly;

47
48.

Id.
Id.
Id. Even in their narrow role of voting not for value choices but simply to monitor

49.
management, shareholders face limits on their power to act as effective policemen. These
limitations can generally be summed up as collective action problems. See David Arthur Skeel,
Jr., The Nature and Effect ofCorporate Voting in Chapter I I Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L.
REv. 461, 473 (1992) (describing shareholders' collective action problems). These include
shareholders' inadequate incentives to investigate the quality of corporate decisions, the costs of
campaigning and coalition-building, and redundant decision-making. See CAMARA, supra note
43, at 223-24 (listing obstacles to effective shareholder voting).
50. As Thomas W. Joo cynically (but not unfairly) observes, the ideal that shareholders
govern in a "corporate democracy" is "a common American myth." Thomas W. Joo, A Trip
Through the Maze of "Corporate Democracy": Shareholder Voice and Management
Composition, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 735, 735 (2003) [hereinafter .Too, Democracy]. Note that
this discussion of shareholder democracy, like Dunlavy's piece, focuses solely on the large
Berle & Means-style publicly traded corporations. Shareholder voting power can look quite
different in the closely-held setting or where there is a large majority shareholder.
51. See id. at 744-45 ("[T]he incumbent board typically nominates a slate of candidates
without input from shareholders.").

1400

63 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1389 (2006)

the opposing faction must fund the expense of sending its own competing ballot
to the shareholders. 52
Shareholders do have the power to withhold votes, and have occasionally
exercised it by opposing nominees for directorships in recent years. Notably, in
the case of the Walt Disney Company's 2004 election, Roy Disney mounted a
campaign that led holders of a then-unprecedented 45% of the company's
shares to withhold votes from Chairman of the Board (and CEO) Michael
53
Eisner. Eventually this led to Eisner's resignation as CEO. 54 But the protest
via non-voting had no legal significance because the default rule in most states,
including Delaware, where Disney is incorporated, gives the board seat to the
winner of the highest number of votes, even if this is only a small plurality.55
Even if a board candidate receives less than a majority of votes cast-or,
indeed, even if she receives just one vote and no competing ballots are castshe is still elected. 56 The typical election is uncontested; thus, shareholders
have no real choice. Each vacancy has but one nominee, and shareholders'
failure to vote for that nominee has no binding legal power on either the
corporation or the board of directors. Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout justifiably
have concluded that "shareholders in public corporations do not in any realistic
sense elect boards. Rather, boards elect themselves. ,,57
52. See id. (describing how corporate law discourages opposition campaigns); George W.
Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L.
REv. 881, 903 (noting that an insurgent must pay her own costs).
53. See Chad Terhune & Joann S. Lublin, At Home Depot, CEO "Pay Rage" Boils Over
in Vote, WALL ST. l, June 2, 2006, at A3 (describing the shareholders' ousting of Michael
Eisner).
54. Id.
55. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2006) (stipulating the quorum and vote
requirements for stock corporations).
56. Joo, Democracy, supra note 50, at 745. Some current corporate governance refOlms
include bylaw amendments that would require a director to resign if a majority of shares cast
withhold votes. On April 20, 2006, the executive council of the powerful Corporate Law
Section of the Delaware State Bar Association endorsed draft legislation to amend the Delaware
General Corporation Law to enable shareholders to introduce an irrevocable change of bylaws
on director elections, as well as to provide for an irrevocable resignation of directors who fail to
get a requisite number of votes. The American Federation of State County and Municipal
Employees has led a campaign for majority voting, and 73 of the over 120 companies with
majority voting in place have made changes in the past 14 months in response to the campaign.
Dennis K. Berman, Boardroom Defenestration, WALL ST. l, Mar. 16, 2006, at B 1; see also
Mark Maremont & Erin White, Stock Activism's Latest Weapon, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2006, at
Cl. The Walt Disney Company has adopted this policy. See Press Release, The Walt Disney
Company, Disney Board Votes to Amend Corporate Governance Guidelines to Adopt Majority
Vote Standard for Director Elections and Adds Anti-Greenmail Provision to By Laws (Aug. 18,
2005), http://corporate.disney.go.com/news/corporate/2005/2005_0818_disneyboardvotes.html.
57. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production TheOlY ofCorporate Law, 85
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Still, some scholars insist that the shareholder vote does matter. Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel view the shareholders' vote as a kind of gapfiller. According to them:
The right to vote is the right to make all decisions not otherwise provided
by contract-whether the contract is express or supplied by legal rule. The
right to make the decisions includes the right to delegate them. Thus voters
may elect directors and ~ive them discretionary powers over things voters
otherwise could control. 8

Easterbrook and Fischel view this process of shareholder voting and
delegation of authority as fundamental to and meaningful within the
governance process-even if voters "almost always" confirm management's
59
decisions. As evidence that the shareholder vote matters, they point out that
higher voting shares do trade at a premium. 60 They also argue that voting must
matter because it has survived. 61
These observations, however, offer little real comfort to the shareholders.
Even if shareholder democracy might somehow legitimize corporate
governance in theory,62 that does not mean that shareholder votes have any real
meaning or power. Higher voting shares may trade at a premium because in
cases of direct democracy (like takeovers) the vote does matter, even though in
the case of annual director elections it does not,63 Finally, the survival of the
shareholder vote for the board might be vestigial or it might have symbolic,
rather than actual, value (as the "legitimation" theory of voting itself
VA. L. REv. 247, 311 (1999).
58. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 261. L. & ECON.
395,402 (1983).
59. Id. at 403.
60. Id. at 407 (noting that classes of stock with stronger voting rights trade at a premium
of two to four percent relative to other classes).
61. Id. at 406. In addition, Easterbrook and Fischel cite instances of what I have termed
"direct" democracy, such as votes on takeovers, and some cases where shareholder votes are not
required, such as stock option plans, choice of independent auditor, and mergers that do not
require a vote. Id. at 417. These instances fall outside of the comparison I am interested in for
the purposes of this Comment.
62. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("The
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial
power rests. ").
63. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 58, at 417. As we have seen, takeovers are an
instance of direct, rather than representative, democracy. Id. at 417-18; see also Henry G.
Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects ofShare Voting: An Essay in Honor ofAdolfA. Berle, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 1427, 1444-45 (1964) (suggesting that the shareholders' takeover vote be
detached from the share and sold separately for a limited period of time because of its inherent
value and uniqueness).
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suggests).64 The fact remains that most shareholders who are dissatisfied with
management do not rely on their voting power to effect change; instead, they
sell.

D. Shareholders' Power ofExit
This blunt reality brings us to the fourth and final disconnect between
voting in the corporate context and in the political sphere: shareholders, unlike
the political electorate, can exit cheaply. A shareholder's power, unlike a U.S.
citizen's power, does not lie only in her ability to vote. It lies also in her ability
to exit-that is, her ability to sell her shares. Shareholders can "vote with their
wallets" and exit from a corporation when they disagree with management's
decisions. This is known as the "Wall Street Rule": shareholders dissatisfied
with management will not attempt to make changes, but instead will sell their
shares. 65
The shareholder's power to sell contrasts sharply with the high cost of exit
for the voter in the civic polity. There is no easy exit from citizenship.
Discontented members of a particular state may choose to leave it, but the costs
of uprooting a household generally far exceed those of selling shares in a
corporation. 66 At the national level, costs of exit are even higher because
moving to a new country typically involves substantial cultural adjustments, as
well as stark disconnection from one's past. In contrast, shareholders must pay
only a relatively small transaction fee in order to liquidate an investment.
These observations led Henry Manne to conclude that the corporation is a "far
more democratic mechanism from the viewpoint of shareholders than is
government from the point of view of voters. ,,67
The Wall Street Rule's admonition that shareholders will choose the path
of selling rather than voting hints that the vote will matter most when selling is
64. See CAMARA, supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting, among other things, that
shareholder voting may be used to placate shareholders and insulate managers).
65. Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating
COIporate Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1,5758 (2001) [hereinafter J00, Finance]. Note that the literature on the market for corporate
control teaches us that the exit option also serves to discipline management. If enough unhappy
shareholders sell, the share price drops, and the corporation becomes a target for takeover. See
generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Marketfor Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110 (1965); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981).
66. See Manne, supra note 63, at 1445 (describing the difficulty of voter mobility in
politics).
67.

Id.
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68
expensive. In keeping with this logic, the Wall Street Rule has a corollary
that forces us to revisit Dunlavy's notion of corporate plutocracy:69 There are
times when it might pay to stay and fight (or vote), rather than to sell, and these
instances also shed light on the differing nature of corporate and civic polities.
As Thomas W. Joo explains:
If the share price is depressed at the time the shareholder disagrees with
management, the shareholder will pay a price to exit. Ifthe share price has
appreciated, exit by liquidation of stock constitutes a taxable event which
may impose costs on the exit. Furthermore, notwithstanding the current
boom in day-trading and other high-turnover strategies, economists
generally agree that a long-term buy-and-hold strategy is the most reliably
profitable method of equity investing. Thus exit may impose costs even
absent a depressed stock price or a tax penalty.70

The noteworthy point that these concerns highlight is the essentially
financial calculus that drives the shareholder's-but not necessarily the
political voter's-decision-making process.
The recent spate of shareholder activism provides another example ofthe
corollary to the Wall Street Rule. Large shareholders sometimes find it
worthwhile to agitate for change within companies. Kirk Kerkorian used his
nearly 10% stake in General Motors to place an ally on the board of directors
and to pressure the company to make strategic changes. 71 Carl Icahn used his
influence as a large shareholder of Time Warner to encourage the company to
conduct a $20 billion stock buyback, to implement an additional $500 million
in cost-cutting, and to appoint two new independent directors to its board in
consultation with major shareholders. 72 Private-equity firms have made their
voices heard at Vivendi 73 and at Wendy's Internationa1. 74 A large investor at
68 See ALBERTO. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE,AND LOYALTY 33 (1970) (liThe voice option
is the only way in which dissatisfied customers or members can react whenever the exit option is
unavailable. ").
69. See Dunlavy, supra note 1, at 10-13 (tracing the growth of corporate plutocracy).
70. Joo, Finance, supra note 65, at 57-59. For further discussion of exit and voice, see
HIRSCffiv1AN, supra note 68, at 33.
71. See Paul Ingrassia, General Malaise, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 27, 2006, at A16 (describing
new board member Jerome B. York as Kerkorian's agent); Monica Langley, Newest Director
Shakes Up GM with Calls for Radical Change, WALL ST. l, Mar. 20,2006, at Al (explaining
York's effect on General Motors).
72. See Matthew Karnitschnig, Time Warner, Jcahn Reach Accord, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18,
2006, at A3 (stating Icahn's role in Time Warner's settlement).
73. See Aaron O. Patrick, Equity Firm Buys 2.5% ofVivendi in Bidfor Change, WALL ST.
l, Mar. 22,2006, at C4 (reporting that private equity firm Sebastian Holdings, Inc. purchased a
stake in Vivendi).
74. See Gregory Zuckerman, Activist Hedge Funds Win Fans on Wall Street, WALL ST. l,
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Six Flags successfully replaced the CEO,75 and a large shareholder opposing
Novartis AG's acquisition of Chiron Corporation threw the deal into question. 76
All of this is in addition to institutional shareholder activism from pension
funds like the California Public Employees' Retirement System and the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. 7:
Shareholder activism sometimes draws support from smaller shareholders,
but it is led in each case by large shareholders. Motivating large shareholders
to police the corporation and the interests of all shareholders is often used as a
justification for the one-share-one-vote principle: "Ifshareholders have a single
vote for each share of stock, their voting power mirrors their economic
incentives. ,,78

IV Revisiting the Comparisons
The corollary to the Wall Street Rule teaches that larger shareholders,
because they have more at stake, are more inclined to fight than are small
shareholders. And this brings us back to Dunlavy, to plutocracy, and to the
perils of comparing corporate and civic polities. It is true that in shareholder
democracy larger shareholders have a greater voice. Whether you think that
one-share-one-vote is a good idea depends on how much you trust large
shareholders. 79 Ratner believes that there is more cause to suspect the motives
of large shareholders than there is to fear the faithless manager. 80 Manne, on
May 8, 2006, at Cl (discussing the hedge funds' recommendations to Wendy's International).
75. Id. (reporting Daniel Snyder's winning the contest to succeed Six Flags, Inc.'s chief
executive officer in November 2005).
76. See David P. Hamilton, Shareholder Insurrection Infects Novartis's $5.1 Billion
Chiron Bid, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3,2006, at C3 (describing Chiron investors as influencing
NovaIiis AG's deal).
77. See Alan Murray, Corporate-Governance Concerns Are Spreading, and Companies
Should Take Heed, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2006, at A2 (providing examples of institutional
investor activism); see also Terhune & Lublin, supra note 53, at A3 (describing shareholders'
voting power).
78. Skeel, supra note 49, at 467.
79. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(December 22, 1995), codified at 15 U.S.c. 77z-1 et seq.; 15 U.S.C. 78u-4 et seq., for example,
favors entrusting lead plaintiff status in a securities class action to large shareholders. See, e.g.,
id. at Sec. 27(a)(3)(B)(iii)(bb).
80. See Ratner, supra note 7, at 20-21 (questioning powerful shareholders ' motivations).
Ratner explains:
There is a much greater likelihood that the single large shareholder, with more
spare money and spare time than the salaried management of the corporation, will
have substantial interests in other businesses than that the salaried managers will

THE SEDUCTIVE COMPARISON

1405

the other hand, disagrees, reasoning that "[w]ith very rare exceptions, there are
no conflicts in the corporate interests ofvoting shareholders. ,,81 In other words,
all shareholders are united in the common cause of making money. 82 In fact,
Manne argues that because of this lack of conflict in motive, unlike many
political decisions, "corporate decisions almost never have a direct wealth
redistribution effect among the shareholders, that is, one changing relative
participations of the shareholders. ,,83
This disagreement poses a fundamental question about what it means to be
more or less democratic. Is it more democratic to have a system that motivates
large shareholders to exercise their power and voice to make changes in the
management of the corporation, so that the electorate's voice, even if
dominated by a large shareholder, is heard? Or is it more truly democratic to
ensure that each voter's power is equal, no matter how much wealth they hold,
with the consequence that resulting transaction costs mute any meaningful
expression of shareholder concerns? Again, the answer depends on whether
shareholder democracy has more to fear from managers or large shareholders.
And what about the undemocratic practice of holding voters once removed
from their representatives? Just as a corporation differs from a nation, so does
a board of directors differ from the Electoral College, despite whatever
convergent evolution made them both representative democracies once
removed. The board plays a decisive role in the governance ofthe corporation,
unlike the Electoral College in the governance of the nation. This Comment
earlier asked why a corporation has a board of directors. 84 After all, we could
have easily moved to the system we as a nation (with our purely functionary
Electoral College) have now, and away from representative democracy once
removed.
have such interests. Also, to the extent that he is less involved than the salaried
managers in the running of the corporation's business, he may have a lesser sense
of identification with the corporation as an entity and a consequently greater
inclination to view the corporation as a means of achieving objects unrelated to the
interests of the shareholders and the corporations' other constituencies.

ld.
81. Manne, supra note 63, at 1441.
82. But see Robert P. Bartlett III, Managing Risk on a $25 Million Bet: Venture Capital,
Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy o/the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REv. (forthcoming
2006) (explaining that conflicts do exist among shareholders); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors (UCLA Law-Econ. Research PaperNo. 05-20,
September 2005) (discussing shareholder conflicts), available at http://www.ssm.com/abstract
=796227.
83. Manne, supra note 63, at 1441.
84. For an attempted answer to the question posed, see generally Lawrence E. Mitchell,
On the Direct Election o/CEOs, 32 OH10N.U. L. REv. 261 (2006).
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A corporation has a board of directors because modern boards, composed
of independent (or "outside,,)85 and management (or "inside,,)86 directors, exist
for a reason. Lawrence Mitchell suggests that the outsider/insider model
evolved in order to shield managers from liability.87 I agree, and would argue
that boards exist today solely to provide the corporation with independent
directors. Independent directors function not as monitors of management, nor
as managers of the corporation. Rather, they provide a mechanism for the
corporation to deal with issues of inherent conflict for management: hostile
takeover bids, levels of executive compensation, and conflict-of-interest
88
transactions. Without the board of directors, there would be no efficient court
oflast resort for dealing with these situations within the corporate structure, no
sanitizing mechanism for managers of the corporation to use. But that is the
subject of another article.
Dunlavy tempts us with the political analogy, challenging us to find points
of connection and disjuncture between corporate and civic polities. These
comparisons are illuminating, but the analogy is by no means perfect. Given
shareholders' right of exit and the lack of shareholder interest in democratic
representation in any ordinary sense, shareholder voting rights are really not
that much like political voting rights. Shareholders are different from citizens;
the purpose oftheir voting power is distinctive and limited, and their elections
function very differently from those of the civic polity. Similarly, the board of
directors, although sharing the characteristic of a representative democracy
once removed, differs fundamentally from the Electoral College. The board
provides independent directors to address areas of management conflict, while
the Electoral College serves no such additional function. Comparison of
political voting to corporate voting provides a useful vehicle for understanding
the characteristics of each more fully. The danger lies in taking principles from
the civic polity and applying them to the corporate polity without considering
the different context of each.

85. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards (OWU Law Sch. Public Law
Research, Paper No. 159, Sept. 9, 2005), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=80/308.
86. Id.
87. See id. (providing a fascinating account of the evolution of the modern model of the
board as monitor).
88. Id.

